Spectres of Coke: Judicial supervision as a revolutionary inheritance by De Ville, Jacques
De Ville, J.  (2007). Spectres of Coke: Judicial supervision as a revolutionary inheritance.  
LAW AND CRITIQUE, 18: 29-54 
 
 
University of the Western Cape Research Repository jdeville@uwc.ac.za 
 
Spectres of Coke: Judicial supervision as a revolutionary 
inheritance 
 
Jacques de Ville  
 
Abstract Sir Edward Coke is known for having played a central role in establishing 
the power of the common law courts to exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over the 
executive/administration. Coke is usually praised in the literature for his boldness in 
doing this, whilst he is at the same time censured for having dared to suggest that this 
jurisdiction should be a very wide one. This essay questions the inheritance of judicial 
supervision and enquires whether there may be a secret to uncover in Coke’s texts. 
Referring to Coke’s Institutes, it is suggested that the wide jurisdiction of the common 
law courts that Coke advanced, is linked to and should be understood in light of 
Coke’s pronouncements in the epigrams on law and justice. Judicial supervision, 
according to this reading of Coke, involves not only a necessarily limited jurisdiction 
in accordance with law, but also the desire for an unlimited jurisdiction, which 
corresponds with Derrida’s analysis of justice and law. This reading of Coke, it is 
suggested, calls on us to view judicial supervision as revolutionary in nature which 
requires of the courts to fundamentally rethink the way in which they exercise their 
supervisory function. 
 
Keywords Coke, Derrida, epigrams, justice, hospitality, Marx, reason, review, 
sovereignty, spectre 
 
‘Let us consider first of all, the radical and necessary heterogeneity of 
inheritance, the difference without opposition that has to mark it, a 
"disparate" and a quasi-juxtaposition without dialectic (the very plural 
of what we will later call Marx's spirits). An inheritance is never 
gathered together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if there 
is one, can consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing. "One 
must" means one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out several 
different possibles that inhabit the same injunction. And inhabit it in a 
contradictory fashion around a secret. If the readability of a legacy were 
given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and at the 
same time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit 
from it. We would be affected by it as by a cause - natural or genetic.’  
 
Jacques Derrida1 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this article was presented at a colloquium hosted by the Research Unit for Legal and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 20-21 October 2005 at the University of Cape Town. I would like to express my 
thanks to the participants (specifically to André van der Walt) as well as to the referees of this article for their 
helpful comments. Johan van der Walt must be thanked for reading Derrida’s Specters of Marx (infra n. 1) with 
me (as part of a discussion group) for the first time. Remaining errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the state of judicial review today seems healthier than ever, at least in the 
minds of certain commentators, this article aims at revisiting its origins. Such an 
enquiry may raise certain questions. It could for example be asked whether the topic 
has not already been sufficiently exhausted and why the ghosts of the past should be 
disturbed if they have been put to rest. The ghosts or spectres (yes, plural) that are at 
issue here are those of Chief Justice, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) (hereafter ‘Coke’). 
This article aims at taking seriously what Derrida tells us in the quotation above as 
well as in some of his other texts2 about inheritance. Applied to the origins of judicial 
review it would imply conjuring Coke’s spirits as spectres (a spectre always being 
animated by a spirit),3 calling them up, without driving them away.4 This would entail 
closely reading the texts of Coke in tracing the origins of judicial review as 
meticulously as possible.5 The way in which the texts of Coke will be read here would 
thus not simply be another attempt to repeat or to conserve the heritage that we know 
so well.6 What will be attempted here is to look for the tensions, the contradictions, 
the heterogeneinity within Coke’s texts.7 As we will see from the analysis that follows, 
the texts that attest to the origins of judicial review do not speak simply of 
responsibility based on knowledge as is usually assumed. Instead we find there a 
certain madness, a certain lack of knowledge, an aporia, undecidability. This is a 
secret we share with Coke; a secret we mostly prefer to forget or to suppress. It cannot 
be transmitted from generation to generation; and if it can be transmitted, this will 
only be as a secret that remains a secret. In a sense, therefore, it has no history, but it 
nevertheless dictates the following to us, that is, to each new generation: we must 
always start over.8  
 
REVIEW JURISDICTION 
 
In 1600 or 1601, we are informed in the Chronology of Events in The Selected 
Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke,9 Shakespeare’s Hamlet was performed 
for the first time: 
 
Hamlet:…Sweare. 
                                                                                                                                                         
1
 Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1994), 16. 
2
 Ibid., at 21; J. Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001 (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 110-111; J. Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 35; ‘On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida’, in J.D. Caputo et al, 
eds., Questioning God (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 52-72 at 59. 
3
 Derrida, supra n.1, at 3. 
4
 Ibid., at 108. 
5
 Derrida in J.D. Caputo, ed., Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1997), 9. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 J. Derrida, The Gift of Death (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 80. 
9
 S. Sheppard, ed., The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke vol 1 (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty 
Fund, 2003), xli. 
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Ghost [Beneath] Sweare. 
[They swear] 
Hamlet: Rest, rest, perturbed Spirit! – So, Gentlemen, 
With all my loue I doe commend me to you: 
And what so poore a man as Hamlet is 
Doe t’expresse his loue and friending to you, 
God willing, shall not lacke: Let us goe in together, 
And still your fingers on your lippes, I pray. 
The time is out of ioynt: - Oh cursed spight, 
That ever I was borne to set it right. 
Nay, come, let’s goe together. [Exeunt] 
Act I, Scene V10 
 
1600 was also the year in which the first volume of the Reports of Sir Edward Coke 
was published. Coke lived in a time out of joint, as the history books relating to this 
period attest to.11 
 
The ‘origins of judicial review’, specifically with reference to the 17th century, is a 
theme which repeatedly finds its way into academic writing.12 These accounts serve 
inter alia the purpose of confirming what administrative lawyers in common law 
countries always believed or at least suspected: Judicial supervision has a long and 
illustrious history with a firm foundation in the 17th century jurisprudence of the 
common law courts, with Coke having played a significant role in this respect. 
Furthermore, it is said in these accounts that this supervision is by its nature 
restricted, in the form of a review rather than an appeal. Most contemporary writers 
on review tell us that although there have been regressions (especially in the first half 
of the 20th century) the courts have on the whole (and specifically in the second half 
of the 20th century) been vigilant in performing their proper functions in relation to 
executive and administrative authorities.13 Moreover, today very little is said to 
remain of the formalism that beset the jurisprudence on judicial review during the 
                                                 
10
 The passage is quoted in Derrida, supra n. 1, at 3.  
11
 H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution, II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal 
Tradition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 201-205 refers to 
the 17th century as the ‘European crisis’, a crisis which had religious, political and socio-economic dimensions. 
See also T. Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe 1560-1660: Essays from Past and Present (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1965); G. Parker and L.M. Smith, eds., The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1978). 
12
 In the 1950s and 1960s a number of important studies appeared in this respect; see L.L. Jaffe and E.G. 
Henderson, ‘Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins’, Law Quarterly Review 72/July (1956), 
345-364; L.L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1965); E.G. Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law: Certiorari and Mandamus in the 
Seventeenth Century (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1963); S.A. de Smith, ‘The Prerogative Writs’, 
The Cambridge Law Journal 11/1 (1951), 40-56 (reprinted in J.M. Evans, De Smith’s Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 4th ed, 1980), 584-595); A. Rubinstein, ‘On the Origins of 
Judicial Review’, University of British Columbia Law Review 2 (1964-1966), 1-20; and A. Rubinstein, 
Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 54-120. Contemporary 
discussions of the origins of judicial review will be referred to in the footnotes that follow. 
13
 See e.g. H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9th ed, 2004), 
15-19. 
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previous three centuries.14 Talk of the ‘jurisdiction’ of administrative authorities has 
all but disappeared, as has the classification of functions.15 It is now regarded as more 
acceptable, also in the courts, to refer to context and to contextual factors that play a 
role in determining the appropriate standard of review.16 The principle of 
proportionality is furthermore becoming an acceptable feature of review and 
fundamental rights play a prominent role.17 Administrative law scholars can thus be 
fairly content these days, it seems. The task facing us, implied by the above account, is 
a simple one: we should simply continue building on the firm foundation laid for us 
by Coke in his Reports and Institutes.  
 
Coke’s Reports and Institutes are undoubtedly an important part of the tradition of 
judicial review. The Reports contain some of the first cases, many in which Coke 
participated as judge, that recognise the supervisory powers of the common law 
courts.18 These include Rooke’s Case (1598),19 the Case of the Isle of Ely (1609),20 the 
Case of Chester Mill upon the River of Dee (1609),21 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610),22 and 
                                                 
14
 Not everyone will agree with this statement; see e.g. the debate between Allan and Craig on formalism: T.R.S 
Allan, ‘Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23/4 
(2003), 563-584; P. Craig, ‘The Common Law, Shared Power and Judicial Review’, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 24/2 (2004), 237-257; T.R.S Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intent: A Reply to Professor 
Craig’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24/4 (2004), 563-583. See also the important contribution of D. 
Dyzenhaus, ‘Formalism’s Hollow Victory’, New Zealand Law Review (2002), 525-556. 
15
 See P. Craig, Administrative Law (London: Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 2003), 407-455, 510-519; C. 
Hoexter with R. Lyster, The New Constitutional and Administrative Law vol 2 (Cape Town: Juta, 2002), 149-
155, 189-190. 
16
 See e.g. Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) 
para 45; Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC); R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433 (HL) paras 27-28. 
17
 Craig, Administrative Law, supra n. 15, at 617-632; Wade and Forsyth, supra n. 13, at 366-369; J.R. de Ville, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003), 203-209. 
18
 Tracing the origins of judicial review in English law could of course start at a much earlier period, e.g. with the 
actions and establishment of the powers of Kings; with the establishment of the first administrative officials or 
bodies (the sheriffs (Anglo-Saxon period), the justices of the peace (12th century) and the sewer commissions 
(13th century)); with the Curia Regis (established by the Normans after the conquest in 1066) from which 
developed the common law courts and from where the itinerant justices were sent out to inter alia supervise local 
government; or with the ‘prerogative’ writs; see e.g. A. Babington, The Rule of Law in Britain: From the Roman 
Occupation to the Present Day 3d ed (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1995), 19, 79 (on the sheriffs); 82-84 (on the 
justices of the peace); 38-39, 70-71 (on the Curia Regis); 77 (on writs); S.B. Chrimes, An Introduction to the 
Administrative History of Mediaeval England (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952); F.J. Port, Administrative Law 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1929), 23-54; J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 4th ed 
(London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002), 12-26, 143-151. 
19
 5 Co. Rep. 99b; see Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 141-144. It was held in this case that the commissioners of sewers 
may not tax only one landowner for the maintenance of a river bank when other landowners also benefit from 
such public works. This case was decided by Judge Walmsley, but Jaffe, supra n. 12, at 625 contends that Coke 
was probably the author of the part of the report on the issue of the scope of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. 
See also P. Raffield, ‘Contract, Classicism, and the Common-Weal: Coke’s Reports and the Foundations of the 
Modern English Constitution’, Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 17 (2005) 69-91 at 72-73 and D. Powell, 
‘Coke in Context: Early Modern Legal Observation and Sir Edward Coke’s Reports’, The Journal of Legal 
History 21/3 (2000) 33-53 at 40-48 on Coke’s ‘authoring’ of the Reports. 
20
 10 Co. Rep. 141a; see Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 378-383. The court in this case held that the commissioners of 
sewers did not have the power to make new rivers and that only those who benefit from public works should be 
taxed to pay for them. 
21
 10 Co. Rep. 137a. The court in this case held that the commissioners of sewers did not have the power to make 
a breach in a causey which was previously constructed for the upkeep of certain mills. 
22
 8 Co. Rep. 113b; see Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 264-283. The court in this case held that the College of 
Physicians did not have the power to fine or imprison a medical doctor educated at Cambridge. 
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James Bagg’s Case (1615).23 The jurisdiction of the King’s Bench as set out in the 
Institutes is of specific importance for scholars of administrative law.24 In the Fourth 
Part of the Institutes 71, Coke sets out the review jurisdiction of the King’s Bench as 
follows: 
 
[T]his Court hath not only jurisdiction to correct errors in judiciall proceeding, 
but other errors and misdemeanours extrajudiciall tending to the breach of the 
peace, or oppression of the subjects, or raising of faction, controversy, debate, 
or any other manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either 
publick or private, can be done but that this shall be reformed or punished in 
one Court or other by due course of Law. As if any person be committed to 
prison, this Court upon motion ought to grant an Habeas corpus, and upon 
returne of the cause do justice and relieve the party wronged. And this may be 
done though the party grieved hath no priviledge in this Court. It granteth 
prohibitions to Courts Temporall and Ecclesiastical to keep them within their 
proper jurisdiction. Also this Court may baile any person for any offence 
whatsoever. And if a Freeman in City, Burgh, or Town corporate be 
disfranchised unjustly, albeit he hath no priviledge in this Court, yet this Court 
may relieve the party, as it appeareth in James Bagges case, ubi supra & sic in 
similibus. 
 
For purposes which should be become clear in the analysis that follows, it should be 
pointed out at this juncture that Coke also notes in the Fourth Part of the Institutes 
that the first Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, before the reign of Edward I, was 
created by Letters Patent and that it is to be noted that the Chief Justice was 
originally instituted for three things: 
 
1. For our preservation. 2. For the tranquillity of our realm. 3. To provide 
justice to all and singular of our realm.25 
 
The above paragraph on jurisdiction contains a summary of the findings of the 
earliest cases on review, cases which laid the foundation for the further development 
of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction.26 The first sentence comes almost verbatim 
                                                 
23
 11 Co. Rep. 93b; see Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 404-417. In this case a writ of restitution was issued to reinstate 
a burgess to office. A number of other cases can of course also be said to be important in the present context, 
especially those dealing with the prerogative powers of the King, e.g. Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 
63 and the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co. Rep. 74; for discussion see P. Craig, ‘Prerogative, Precedent 
and Power’, in C. Forsyth and I. Hare, eds., The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), 65-89 at 67-68; A. Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2005), 69-74. 
24
 As De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 
1995), 616 (para 14-001) point out, the jurisdiction of the Queen’s Bench Division (as well as that exercised by 
the superior courts in common-law countries) is ‘directly linked to that of the Court of King’s Bench in the 
seventeenth century and earlier’. 
25
 Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 1178 (vol II). Coke notes that the third ‘thing’ mentioned here, ‘was the original 
jurisdiction of this Court’. 
26
 E. Jenks, ‘The Prerogative Writs in English Law’, Yale Law Journal 32/6 (1923), 523-534 at 530-531; Jaffe, 
supra n. 12, at 329-334; Henderson, supra n. 12, at 72; J. Laws, ‘Wednesbury’, in C. Forsyth and I. Hare, eds., 
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from James Bagg’s Case.27 Coke’s decisions on review were, to put it mildly, not well 
received by his peers.28 Administrative lawyers of the present and previous century, 
despite their praise for the role Coke played in establishing the institution of judicial 
review, similarly criticise him, sometimes vehemently, for his decisions on review, 
and for his views on the scope of the court’s supervisory powers.29 In the latter 
respect he has been charged with having set up the judicial power as a ‘third force’, ‘in 
the day-to-day operation of government’.30 Regarding his decisions on review, it has 
inter alia been argued that there was no previous authority for the remedy granted in 
James Baggs’ Case and which later developed into the writ of mandamus.31  
 
It seems logical to contend that the jurisdiction of the Court that is laid down in 
Coke’s Institutes should be viewed in the context of the battle over jurisdiction with 
the other courts32 and the question of the prerogative of the King.33 This history is 
well-documented and will not be recounted here. We can nonetheless remind 
ourselves that Coke’s views presented a severe threat to James I34 and that his 
disagreement with the latter regarding these matters would eventually contribute to 
his dismissal as Chief Justice (in 1616, the year in which Shakespeare died).35 Because 
of Coke’s central role in these disputes, it can furthermore be fairly safely assumed 
that his decisions on administrative law matters as well as the matters addressed in 
the Institutes can be read as not only concerned with correcting the wrongs 
perpetrated in the specific matters, but with the wrongs of the times;36 ‘setting right’ 
the relationship between the King and the courts.37 The jurisdiction of the court as set 
                                                                                                                                                         
The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 185-201 at 190-191; P. Craig 
‘Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review’ in Forsyth, ed., Judicial Review and the Constitution 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 47-71 at 63; P. Craig, ‘Public Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory’ Public 
Law Summer (2000) 211-239 at 231-233; D. Oliver, ‘Public Law Procedures and Remedies – Do we need Them’ 
Public Law Spring (2002), 91-110; C. Russell, ‘Topsy and the King: The English Common Law, King James VI 
and I and the Union of the Crowns’ Public Law Summer (2005), 336-345 at 337-338. 
27
 Supra n. 23. 
28
 Jaffe and Henderson, supra n. 12 at 353-4 quoting from the Acts of the Privy Council, 1616-1617 at 57. See 
also Jaffe, supra n. 12, at 207. 
29
 Ibid., at 348. See also A.C. Aman and W.T. Mayton, Administrative Law (St Paul, Minn: West Group, 2d ed, 
2001), 347 who refer to ‘Lord Coke’s sweeping assertion of judicial authority’; and Evans, supra n. 12, at 592 
where De Smith refers to Coke’s ‘sweeping proposition’.  
30
 Jaffe and Henderson, supra n. 12 at 355. 
31
 Jaffe, supra n. 12, at 210, 331; Henderson, supra n. 12, at 72; Jaffe and Henderson, supra n. 12 at 359. 
32
 See also Craig, Administrative Law supra n. 15, at 6. 
33
 See Berman, supra, n 11, at 201-230, J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of 
English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Reissue 1987) 
30-55. 
34
 As A. Cromartie, ‘The Constitutionalist Revolution: The Transformation of Political Culture in Early Stuart 
England’ Past and Present 163 (1999), 76-120 at 100 points out, ‘Coke’s ideas were dangerous to kings, because 
the omnicompetence of law supplied him with a never-failing standard by which to judge monarchical 
behaviour’.  
35
 See Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England vol I (New York: George W. Smith & 
Company, 1874), 290-296. 
36
 The Second, Third and Fourth Parts of the Institutes were of course published only posthumously, but they 
were likely prepared between 1629 and 1634. The Twelfth Part of the Reports was published for the first time in 
1656 and the Thirteenth Part in 1659; Sheppard, supra n. 9, at lxv and lxvii. 
37
 See also Pocock, supra n. 33, at 46 and Raffield, supra, n. 19, at 72, 81-82 and 91 on Coke’s use of case law 
and the Institutes for this purpose. 
  
7 
 
out above can, based on this reading, be attributed inter alia to Coke’s opposition to 
absolute monarchy. 
 
The criticism of Coke by administrative lawyers is closely related to the above events. 
At more or less the same time that Coke was dismissed as Chief Justice, the courts 
effectively lost their powers of supervision, at least over the sewer commissions, such 
supervision thereafter taking place through the King’s Council and the prerogative 
courts.38 With the re-assumption of the power of supervision by the common law 
courts after the demise of the powers of the Council, the judiciary was seemingly 
more compliant and interfered only where the issue was jurisdictional in nature.39 
One of the implicit ‘messages’ relayed by administrative law scholars supportive of 
the institution of judicial review in recounting its origins seems to be that judges 
should realise that if they overstep the proper limits of their review powers, they can 
expect to lose all their powers of supervision.40  
 
Based on the above and in analysing Coke’s dicta on jurisdiction, the reference to 
justice in the above quotations must presumably be understood with reference to 
Coke’s belief that natural law was incorporated into English common law.41 Lewis,42 
for example, understands Coke as saying that the common law can be equated with 
the law of nature. He points out that fundamental law, reasonableness and common 
law are unified as well as identified in Coke’s thinking.43 Coke’s thinking in this 
respect furthermore seems to be closely related to the doctrine or cult of the ancient 
constitution which seventeenth century common lawyers, specifically Coke, believed 
                                                 
38
 Jaffe and Henderson, supra, n. 12 at 353-355; Jaffe, supra n. 12, at 208; Henderson, supra n. 12, at 34 
According to Evans, supra n. 12, at 93-94, although there was a rise in conciliar jurisdiction during this period, 
this jurisdiction did not purport to be all-embracing. It appears that the Council and the Court of Star Chamber 
(from the 16th century until the abolishment of the Star Chamber in 1641) were much less concerned than the 
common law courts with protecting property rights and the liberty of the subject; see G. Radcliffe and G. Cross, 
The English Legal System (London: Butterworths, 6th ed, 1977), 110-112; W. Holdsworth, A History of English 
Law vol IV (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, Reprinted 1966), 70-88. 
39
 Jaffe and Henderson, supra n. 12, at 348. 
40
 See also the warning of the Lord Chancellor, Ellesmere on the occasion of the swearing in of Sir Henry 
Montague who replaced Coke as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench reported by Rubinstein ‘On the Origins of 
Judicial Review’, supra n. 12, at 13; Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality, supra n. 12, at 71; and see Lord 
Parker Recent Developments in the Supervisory Powers of the Courts over Inferior Tribunals: Lectures by Lord 
Parker of Waddington, Lord Chief Justice of England (Jerusalem: Magnes Press 1959) 27-28. 
41
 Berman, supra, n 11, at 243-244; Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608) (in Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 
166 at 174); M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 119. 
See also P. Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice and Political Power 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-3, 261-2, 264-267 who reads Coke’s views on the common 
law as aspiring towards a utopian ideal. 
42
 J.U. Lewis, ‘Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634): His Theory of “Artificial Reason” as a Context for Modern Basic 
Legal Theory’, in A.D. Boyer, ed., Law, Liberty and Parliament: Selected Essays on the Writings of Sir Edward 
Coke (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 107-120 at 115-116 
43
 Ibid. See also E. Sandoz, ‘Fortescue, Coke, and Anglo-American Constitutionalism’ in E. Sandoz, ed., The 
Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law 
(University of Missouri Press, Columbia 1993), 1-21 at 7 who finds in Sir John Fortescue (ca 1385 – ca 1479), 
‘Coke’s master in the law of the constitution’ (at 5), the same idea namely that ‘the historically ancient and the 
ontologically higher law – eternal, divine, natural – are woven together to compose a single harmonious texture’. 
See also Raffield, supra, n. 19, at 71; and Cromartie, supra n. 34, at 87-88. 
  
8 
 
in.44 On this reading, when Coke therefore says that a court, in exercising its 
supervisory jurisdiction, must remedy injustices, he was saying no more, in today’s 
terms, than that an appropriate judicial remedy needs to be granted where a review 
ground is present (although this was stated in broader terms than is today regarded 
as ‘appropriate’). ‘Appropriateness’ is furthermore to be determined in accordance 
with reason; the reason of ‘an infinite number of grave and learned men’45 who know 
what is needed for our preservation, for the tranquillity of our realm, for providing 
justice to all and singular of our realm.46 The paragraph on jurisdiction thus speaks of 
the sovereign reasoning of the respectable, right-thinking bourgeois47 as well as of the 
friend as the brother.48 The protection of the right to property, of the inherited liberty 
of free men49 and of existing rights was and is of course central to this mode of 
reasoning.50  
 
On this reading we can conclude that Coke was similar to Hegel’s Hamlet: a Hamlet 
who (in Hegel’s view) has wrongly been depicted as being indecisive in what he 
should do. In Hegel’s view Hamlet is in actual fact resolute in what he has set out to 
do, merely being indecisive in how he should do it.51 Into the turbulent times of the 
seventeenth century thus stepped not a Hamlet of uncertainty, but someone even 
more sure of himself than Hegel’s Hamlet – a Hamlet who knew exactly how to put 
things right.52 Coke, on this reading, is not Derrida’s Hamlet: a Hamlet who is called 
on by his father’s ghost to do justice, but in whom we can see ‘the hesitation to take 
revenge, the deliberation, the non-naturality or the non-automaticity of the 
calculation: neurosis, if you like’.53 Derrida’s Hamlet faces the abyss that is opened up 
                                                 
44
 See Pocock, supra n. 33; J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and 
History (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1960), 202-232; M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 42-46, 151. 
45
 See the First Part of the Institutes 97b (Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 701 (vol II)). 
46
 See supra. 
47
 J. Derrida Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005) 64, 69, 101.  
48
 See J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship (London and New York: Verso, 1997). 
49
 See e.g. Ch 9 of the Magna Carta as discussed by Coke in the Second Part of the Institutes. See, however, also 
Ch 29 which does protect certain freedoms of certain women. 
50
 J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 54; Craig, 
Administrative Law supra n. 15, at 9, 416. See also Raffield, supra, n. 19, at 79 and 89 where the author 
identifies landowners and entrepreneurs as the principal beneficiaries of Coke’s interpretation of the law. 
Tomkins, supra n. 23, at 73-74 is to the same effect. P. Raffield, ‘Bodies of Law: The Divine Architect, 
Common Law and the Constitution’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 13 (2000) 333-356 at 348-
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die.” Dormit aliquando jus, moritur nunquam. For of such an high estimation is right in the eye of the law, as the 
law preserveth it from death and destruction: trodden downe it may bee, but never trodden out.’ 
51
 G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art vol I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 244. 
52
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through the differential and deferential relationship between law and justice, a justice 
which remains forever out of joint.54 
 
 
REVIEW JURISDICTION RE-VIEWED 
 
The above account as well as that of authors who have written on Coke is based on a 
reading of Coke’s texts as a unity, as conveying a central message, even though 
different interpretations are adopted. What would be the consequence if we instead 
view Coke’s texts as being heterogeneous in nature? May there then perhaps be a 
secret to uncover in Coke’s texts? Coke may be said to have already anticipated such a 
reading of his texts. In the Preface to Part Three of the Reports55 he says that judges 
should not have to give reasons for every case that they decide. If they were to do so, 
judges would not have time to render other services to the Commonwealth, case 
records would become too voluminous, and judgments would lose some of their 
authority and reverence. He continues: 
 
But mine advice is, that whensoever a man is enforced to yeeld a reason of his 
opinion or judgement, that then hee set down all authorities, presidents, 
reasons, arguments, and inferences whatsoever that may bee probably applied 
to the case in question; For some will be perswaded, or drawne by one, and 
some by another, according as the capacitie or understanding of the hearer or 
reader is. These Records for that they contain great and hidden treasure, are 
faithfully and safely kept (as they well deserve) in the Kings treasurie.56 
 
In reading Coke, a distinction has to be drawn between his philosophy or theoretical 
approach and his texts. The ‘theoretical approach’ of Coke, as set out above also in 
relation to judicial supervision, is necessarily an abstraction and a simplification. 
Conjuring the spirit of Coke usually results in immediately reducing his texts, through 
a wilful imposition, to a singular, domesticated meaning57 where instead there is 
heterogeneity. The Cokean inheritance as we find it in academic books and journals is 
absolutely and thoroughly determinate, and it is likely to remain that way.58 The text 
from which Coke’s theoretical approach has been excised is however ‘complex and 
heterogeneous, a multiplex of innumerable threads and layers’.59 There is in other 
words more than one spirit/spectre of Coke, there must be more than one of them, 
Derrida would say.60 Coke, in spite of himself, quotes with seeming approval, 
                                                 
54
 J. Derrida and E. Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow…A Dialogue (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2004), 81. 
55
 Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 60. 
56
 Ibid (emphasis added). 
57
 See also J.R. Stoner, Common Law and Liberal Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of American 
Constitutionalism (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 16 on the supposed integrity and simple unity of 
Coke’s work, also in his own view. 
58
 See J. Derrida, ‘Spectres of Marx’, New Left Review 205 (1994) 31-58 at 33 on the Marxist inheritance. 
59
 See Caputo, supra n. 5, at 82; B. Johnson ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in J. Derrida Dissemination (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2004 ed) xv. 
60
 Derrida, n. 56, at 33. 
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statements (which, based on a traditional reading would be regarded as merely for 
ornamentation) on the relationship between law and justice which do not fit into the 
above theoretical account of his thinking as a whole. Let us note a few of Coke’s dicta 
on law and justice. In the epigrams from the title page of Part Two of the Reports the 
following dicta appear in relation to law: 
 
PAPIAN. Lib. I. Definit.  
Law is a universal command, the resolution of prudent men, restraining 
offences (whether knowingly or unwittingly committed), a general consensus 
of the common weal. 
ISODORUS 
Lex (law) is so called from ligando (binding), because it binds, or it is so called 
from legendo (reading), because it is read out in public. 
CIC. Lib. I. de Legibus 
When I say the law, I wish nothing else to be understood to be said by me but 
imperium (authority), without which no house, no city, no people, nor any 
kind of man, nor the nature of things, nor even the world itself, can stand.61 
 
In the epigrams from the title page of part 10 of the Reports (in which the Case of the 
Isle of Ely and the Case of Chester Mill are reported),62 the following statement on 
justice appears: 
 
St Jerome: Justice did not know a father, mother, or brother, and did not take 
on a personality; but it imitates God.63 
 
Thus far, these epigrams have generally64 been treated in the literature as something 
which can be ignored: mere supplements of or ornamentations to the text.65 Coke 
nevertheless uses epigrams to frame the Reports as well as the Institutes. They are 
neither the work (ergon) nor outside the work.66 Why does Coke do so if they are not 
needed? Does it perhaps show some lack in the Reports and the Institutes 
‘themselves’? Do the epigrams perhaps express something which could not be stated 
‘in’ the Reports and the Institutes, ‘things’ so disruptive that they could not be said 
                                                 
61
 Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 37-38. 
62
 See n. 20 and 21 supra. 
63
 Ibid., at 327. 
64
 N. Mathews, Francis Bacon: The History of a Character Assassination (Yale University Press, 1996) starts his 
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(see Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 1341-1377 (vol III) for a representative list). It is likely that there have been other 
references in the literature to Coke’s epigrams, although these are unlikely to have emphasized the paradoxes 
that may result from such references. 
65
 Raffield, supra n. 41, at 13-14, 18, 31, 41, 49, 63, 128-129, 206; Raffield, supra n. 50, at 335, 345 and 347; 
Raffield, supra, n. 19, at 71, 73, 76, 81, 82; and P. Raffield, ‘The Failings of Common Lawyers and their 
Representation in Seventeenth Century Satirical Drama’, Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 17 (2005), 365-
389 at 383 and 385 refers to some of the Prefaces of Coke’s Reports and Institutes in his reading of the common 
law as both insular and protectionist on the one hand and as aspiring towards utopia or as expressing the 
principles of civic republicanism on the other. Raffield does not refer to the epigrams. Pocock, supra n. 33 also 
refers frequently to the Prefaces of Coke’s Reports.  
66
 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 9 on the 
parergon. 
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there, but which nevertheless required saying? Do they perhaps express Coke’s 
desires? Epigrams, we know, were first used as inscriptions, and later developed into 
a form of poetry.67 It is defined as ‘a witty, often paradoxical remark, concisely 
expressed’68 or as a ‘pointed or antithetical saying’.69 Coke’s epigrams are not 
generally marked by paradox or antithesis ‘within’. The paradox or antithesis appears 
rather to be found in relation to the text (understood here in the classical sense as the 
‘main body’ of the written work), but without simply opposing the ‘text’. As we can see 
from the above epigrams, some of them repeat the ‘wisdom’ that is expressed in the 
‘text’, for example in relation to the question of what law is: a good parergon thus. 
But there also appear to be perverted parerga, like the epigram above which talks 
about justice and which appears to say something different from what is stated in the 
Reports and Institutes; which draws attention to itself and not to the text; a seductive 
adornment thus like a golden frame.70 A perverted epigram remains a parergon 
nonetheless.71 The ergon is in need of the parergon, and vice versa:  
 
[T]he ergon is never fully complete, never fully finished, never fully 
independent, but rather entails an inner lack which calls forth (in an 
atemporal sense) the parergon to complete it. The painting is never without a 
frame, whether it is explicitly framed or not.72 
 
In spite of the text (in the classical sense) of the Reports and Institutes presenting 
themselves as complete, as not lacking, the epigrams (presented by Coke and read 
throughout history as mere ornaments) are thus central and essential to the Reports 
and the Institutes, providing their orientation; an internal opening in the same.73 Like 
the frame of a painting, the clothing on statutes, the columns around extravagant 
buildings,74 these (perverted) epigrams, in spite of their ‘paradoxical’ or ‘antithetical’ 
nature, are furthermore not subject to the Hegelian Aufhebung75 as they are neither 
wholly inside nor wholly outside the Reports and Institutes.76 They do not signify or 
represent anything; they are ‘deprived of theme and text (in the classical sense)’;77 
they are ‘vague beauties’ without concept and without aim,78 ‘the trace of a ghost 
                                                 
67
 Marcus Varelius Martialis (ca. 40 – 104 AD) is credited with the development of the modern epigram. He used 
epigrams to criticise the vices of society; see www.ancientworlds.net/aw/Personas/LoginForm (access 
confirmed: 22 May 2006). 
68
 Collins English Dictionary. 
69
 Oxford English Dictionary Online.  
70
 Derrida, supra n. 66, at 64. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 See I.E. Harvey ‘Kant’ in H.J. Silverman, ed., Continental Philosophy II: Derrida and Deconstruction (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1989), 59-76 at 73; see also Derrida, supra n. 66, at 59-60. 
73
 See Harvey, supra, n. 72 at 71, 74. 
74
 Derrida, supra n. 66, at 57-61. 
75
 I.E. Harvey, Derrida and the Economy of Différance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) 170, 207-
208; D. Rathbone, ‘Encounters with other Philosophers: Hegel’ in J. Reynolds and J. Rolfe, eds., Understanding 
Derrida (New York and London: Continuum, 2004), 134-142. 
76
 J. Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (London: Routledge, 1982), 194; 
Derrida, supra n. 66, at 61. 
77
 Derrida, supra n. 66, at 97. 
78
 Derrida, supra n. 66, at 92-93 and 96-97. 
  
12 
 
disorganizing all ontologies, exceeding in its hauntological energy, as the other’s 
signature’.79  
 
Coke’s Reports and Institutes can thus be said to have a paradoxical structure. This 
paradoxical structure is also to be found in relation to more specific issues like that of 
jurisdiction. In the Preface to the Fourth Part of the Institutes Coke explains the 
notion of jurisdiction with reference to this paradoxical structure as follows: 
 
We in this Fourth and last part of the Institutes are to speak of the Jurisdiction 
of the Courts of Justice within this Realm. 
Jurisdiction is the authority of adjudicating or stating the law between parties 
concerning actions of persons and matters, according as they are brought to 
judgment, by ordinary or delegated authority: And again, Jurisdiction is a 
power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of doing 
justice. [Jurisdiction is derived from] jus (law) and dicio (authority), that is, 
authority of law.80 
 
The clear distinction that Coke draws in the above passage and in the epigrams 
between law and justice is striking. This justice that must be done (the necessity of 
justice, Coke says) is not to be understood as justice in accordance with law. Justice, 
understood as having been incorporated into the common law, Coke seems to be 
saying here, is no longer justice; justice is thereby neutralised, it loses its disruptive 
force. ‘Justice did not know a father, mother, or brother, and did not take on a 
personality; but it imitates God’, says St Jerome, repeats Coke. Law, which is nothing 
but authority, protects the oikos, the home, the family, the nation; it is there for our 
preservation. Justice, on the other hand, does not have a father or mother or brother, 
and therefore has no concern with the oikos, the home, the family, the nation. By 
analogy we can say that whereas law according to Coke concerns itself with existing 
rights, inherited freedoms and property, justice speaks of ‘the incalculable equality in 
a freedom that is alike for all’.81 Justice furthermore ‘did not take on a personality’ 
Coke says: justice does not exclude the other in order to take on an identity, to 
become a subject.82 Justice, if it exists, is not identical to itself. Justice does not retain 
mastery/sovereignty of the house.83 Justice, if it exists, is absolute hospitality.84 
Justice concerns a pure gift with no return to the self.85 Justice cannot be represented 
in or through law.86 Justice remains to come.87 Justice ‘imitates God’ Coke says: The 
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 J. Wolfreys ‘Art’ in J. Reynolds and J. Rolfe, eds., Understanding Derrida (New York and London: 
Continuum, 2004), 84-92 at 90. 
80
 Sheppard, supra n. 9, at 1058 (vol II). 
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 Derrida, supra n. 47 at 49. 
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 Derrida, supra n. 48, at 68. 
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 J. Derrida, Acts of Religion (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 363-364. 
84
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85
 J. Derrida ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ in D. Cornell et al, eds., Deconstruction 
and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3-67 at 25. 
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God of St Jerome (and the God of Coke), if s/he exists, is love;88 and love, if it exists, 
is ‘a gift of infinite love, a goodness that is forgetful of itself’.89 The love of God is 
therefore not a love for the self; God, if s/he exists, is the one who loves the stranger, 
excessively so.90 Justice, if it exists, is an experience of the impossible. Justice has no 
concern for the self, the home, the family, the nation. Justice, if it exists, is absolute 
hospitality,91 the pure gift,92 unconditional forgiveness.93 
 
This raises a number of questions. Why would Coke choose this quotation from St 
Jerome which can, almost four centuries after he cited it, lead to all kinds of 
(mis)interpretations, rather than relying on a ‘safer’ passage which shows the 
transcendent,94 yet conditional nature of forgiveness and of justice? In Letter 21(34) 
St Jerome, in commenting on the parable of the prodigal son, for example says the 
following: 
 
AND HE [the older brother] ANSWERING SAID TO HIS FATHER: BEHOLD, 
FOR SO MANY YEARS DO I SERVE THEE. The father as suppliant begs him 
to make peace. But he, following the justice that is in the law, is not obedient to 
the justice of God.95 And besides, what is greater than the justice of God, 
greater than forgiving the penitent and saving a son who returns?96 
 
We can only, no, we must conclude that Coke, despite himself, also spoke of an 
impossible justice, of absolute hospitality, the pure gift and of unconditional 
forgiveness.  
 
JURISDICTION AND REVOLUTION 
 
In the discussion above we saw Coke being acknowledged and praised for bringing 
about the institution of judicial supervision in the form that we know it today. At the 
same time, what Coke said in relation to judicial supervision is a cause for great 
discomfort. This discomfort is perhaps understandable in light of the turmoil (inter 
alia a bloody civil war and a revolution)97 which followed upon (although not 
necessarily from) Coke’s pronouncements. Coke, we can say, is praised (though with 
some discomfort) as a (bourgeois) revolutionary - a revolutionary who, similar to the 
great revolutionaries, dared to act ‘outside of the law’ in founding a new law.98 The 
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 1 John 4:16. 
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 Derrida, supra n. 8, at 51. 
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 J. Derrida, Adieu: To Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999) 104. 
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new law refers here specifically to the law99 which authorises judicial supervision, 
determines its scope and the remedies that may be granted. This ‘law’, although it was 
founded before the English revolution, was confirmed and re-established through the 
revolution. Coke wanted to retain (or to bring about) a constitutional monarchy, 
something which would not happen without a revolution.100 Coke’s words however 
testify to the fact that he can be read as not only a bourgeois revolutionary, but a 
revolutionary inspired (even before Marx) by a certain spirit of Marx; by ‘an idea of 
justice irreducible to [law or to] all the failures of communism’.101 As Defoort102 points 
out, nothing is praised as much as that which was done by those who founded a (new) 
state. However, those same things which are praised are as strictly prohibited from 
being repeated. Coke’s spirit is conjured up as spectre by Jaffe and Henderson, and by 
De Smith and by Craig and by Aman and Mayton and by others, we can say, simply 
for the spectre to be silenced, to be driven away.103 What we are left with after the 
conjuration and exorcism is thus no longer a spirit/spectre.104 Insofar as it can still be 
identified as a spirit/spectre, it has been thoroughly domesticated by having been 
transformed, incorporated or embodied into an official representation.105 We need to 
be sure, these authors say, swearing together, about the appropriate dividing line 
between what Coke said and the present reality today. The ‘reality’ today, we are told, 
is that judicial review is and cannot legitimately be anything but a more or less 
(depending on who is talking)106 restricted form of supervision which concerns itself 
with the legality or validity of an administrative or executive decision (sometimes said 
to overlap with the merits).107 As should be clear, there is no space for justice in this 
model, except insofar as justice is viewed as incorporated into law. Judicial 
supervision in this model is simply the administering of a pre-determined 
programme where nothing radically new is allowed to happen. Coke’s talk of 
correcting every error (‘no wrong or injury, either publick or private, can be done, but 
that all this shall be reformed or punished’) is regarded as dangerous, outrageous, 
revolutionary.  
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These authors are of course right in a certain sense. What Coke said with regard to 
jurisdiction and justice would be asking of judges to do the impossible; judicial 
supervision and justice in accordance with law can become possible only by placing 
restrictions on, by forgetting, deferring, repressing this desire for justice and for the 
exercise of an unlimited jurisdiction (the impossible).108 Coke’s ‘sweeping’ 
jurisdiction (the desire for the impossible), we can say, can never present itself as 
such. To make this unconditional or unlimited jurisdiction effective, it has to be 
limited, it has to become determinate, conditional, restricted.109 Even though a 
limited jurisdiction can be said to effectively destroy the notion of an unlimited 
jurisdiction, a trace of the impossible, the trace of its withdrawal, nevertheless always 
remains within the possible; the possible continues to be haunted by the 
impossible.110 The desire for the impossible thus remains, because of the permanent 
out-of-joint-ness of that which is possible (law’s lack of justice).111 Coke’s ghosts will 
therefore surface again and again (in the unconditional promise112 contained in the 
concept of ‘jurisdiction’ to supervise the administration and in the call of those who 
are excluded from administrative justice) in spite of this oath of allegiance, this 
hegemony (which Coke himself, or rather someone in him, shares with today’s 
authors) that organises the repression and which thereby paradoxically confirm the 
haunting.113 The ‘reality’ today which the authors on judicial review describe can thus 
rather be termed a very intricate unreality:114 a spectre thus, neither pure body nor 
pure spirit.115  
 
Should we be prepared to face our anxieties, to risk our homes, our preservation, our 
needs, and not drive away the ghosts of Coke so eagerly, in such good conscience,116 
but allow them to come back, to welcome them, dare we then, in light of our 
reflections on Coke and justice, assert the following: When Coke sets out the 
jurisdiction of the King’s Bench as it relates to the supervision of inferior jurisdictions 
(in James Bagg’s Case and in the Institutes), he is saying the following: Firstly, the 
concept of jurisdiction involves two contradictory but indissociable things: The one is 
a desire for justice. This does not refer simply to what you would today call exercising 
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an appeal or a more restricted review function or granting the remedies you associate 
with it. It refers to the supervision of all errors and misdemeanours, all public and 
private wrongs, any manner of misgovernment117 – a jurisdiction without any limits - 
as well as to the reformation of all errors and misdemeanours. The remedial function 
does not mean simply compensating a wrong or restituting something that is due, but 
to give beyond due - a gift without restitution, without calculation, without 
accountability.118 A judge must nevertheless also decide according to the law and take 
account of the particular socio-economic, political context, which inevitably implies 
placing restrictions on the specific parties who are allowed to come to court and the 
scope of supervision. It also means granting orders which can indeed practically, 
albeit imperfectly, remedy the situation at hand without placing an undue burden on 
the state administration.119 At different times and different places, these restrictions, 
which are always necessary, but never completely justified, will take on different 
forms. The relation between law and justice in other words involves undecidability, a 
double bind: we have a desire for justice and we have to judge in accordance with 
law.120 It is here, in the differential and deferential relationship, in enduring the 
antinomy between law and justice, that responsibility lies. Jurisdiction, in addition to 
attempting to stabilize the future, contains a promise of a justice to come; it says 
something of the future; it implies something for future decisions. One never knows 
what the future will hold; the future remains to be decided and it can only be decided 
by traversing the limit between law and justice. As Derrida says - 
 
[i]f the stabilized stability of certainty is never given, if it is conquered in the 
course of a stabilization, then the stabilization of what becomes certain must 
cross – and therefore, in one way or another, recall or be reminded of – the 
suspended indecision, the undecidable qua the time of reflection.121 
 
Secondly, the law (here referring specifically to the law relating to judicial supervision 
and separation of powers) must, in every case, if we are to do justice, be suspended so 
as to create it anew.122 In some instances this may require transgressing the 
traditional limits of supervision and the creation of a new remedy (‘out of whole cloth’ 
as Jaffe123 says) as was done in James Bagg’s Case. Remedies, it must be kept in 
mind, should still be distinguished from doing justice. In order for a decision in 
judicial supervision proceedings to be just, it cannot thus simply preserve that which 
has been established. In establishing the institution of judicial supervision justice is 
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deferred and the differential relationship between law and justice is instituted.124 This 
is repeated in every act of judicial supervision: justice can only, but at the same time 
cannot be brought about through law. Law (whether understood as statutory law, 
common law or custom), with its origins clouded in the mists of time, is never to be 
equated with justice and is ultimately a violence without ground.125 This is not a 
sceptical or nihilistic argument. Judicial supervision which simply entails applying 
the existing law and which does not suspend and re-found the law would have no 
relation to justice.126 Every instance of judicial supervision is in effect a celebration, a 
suspension, a re-institution and a re-justification of this revolutionary moment.127 
Judges are called upon to be revolutionaries. Thirdly, understanding the common law 
as perfect reason admittedly allows for evolution and growth in accordance with the 
values of the community. At the same time, it implies a period of waiting. Justice, on 
the other hand, requires urgency, justice does not wait. Justice requires a decision 
that disrupts the values of the ‘community’ at a specific point in time.128  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Why should we read the origins of judicial review as suggested above? Perhaps the 
answer lies in Hannah Arendt’s book on the trial of Adolf Eichmann, prosecuted for 
his role as chief architect and executioner of the ‘final solution’ to the ‘Jewish 
problem’.129 Arendt coined the phrase ‘the banality of evil’ to describe the actions of 
Eichmann, someone whom she regarded as not being an evil man with a hatred for 
Jews, but an innocuous individual who simply followed orders in the same way in 
which other bureaucratically assigned responsibilities would have to be carried out. 
He was a ‘joiner’, a conformist, ‘a leaf in the whirlwind of time’,130 and a ‘terribly and 
terrifyingly normal’ man.131 The ‘orders’ in the context of judicial review, it could be 
argued, are the restrictions (currently regarded as ‘acceptable both to the judges and 
to public opinion’, or ‘apt for our needs today’, as Jaffe and Henderson132 might put 
it) on the duty to ‘provide justice to all and singular of our realm’: the restrictions 
imposed on justice ‘for our preservation’; for ‘the tranquillity of our realm’. These 
restrictions are those limiting access to the courts, limiting the scope of review 
(usually to the exercise of public rather than private powers), the standard of review 
(proportionality or correctness on the one hand and a very deferential rationality 
standard which can effectively turn the issue into a non-justiciable one on the other) 
and the remedies that may be granted. These restrictions may not necessarily cause 
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death,133 but they often have a severe impact on the inequalities that are tolerated 
within, on and beyond the borders of nation-states (for example in relation to 
housing, land, health, water, food, electricity, education, employment, social security 
and access to justice) and on those who find themselves in other ways excluded (by 
being imprisoned or detained, often in deplorable conditions, or forcefully excluded 
through border controls or for reasons of national security) because of unequal 
freedom.134 In some common law countries, and I am thinking here specifically of 
South Africa, the inefficiency and apathy of state organs and officials tasked to bring 
about greater equality as well as budget preferences which do not reflect this concern, 
constitute some of the major injustices.135 The death and destruction caused by the 
arms industry, which form a major part of Western economies and which usually 
manage to escape from judicial supervision, also require mention as do 
environmental injustices which are often the consequence of ‘economic freedom’.136 
The judges in the common law world may never (again)137 have to answer for how 
they have exercised their supervisory jurisdiction. This does not however absolve 
judges from their responsibility as heirs, also of Coke’s writings. One of Coke’s spirits 
‘keeps trying to reach us, to speak to us, to summon us to live otherwise – that is, 
more justly – and urges us not to forget that we are the heirs of a never fulfilled 
promise’:138 to bring about justice.  
 
This is not to say that there should be no limits on access to the courts, the scope of 
review, the grounds of review, or the remedies that may be granted; neither does it 
mean that there should not be different standards of review. The survival of 
constitutional democracy (our preservation) ultimately depends on such limits. 
Remaining faithful to this spirit of Coke will nevertheless imply a loosening of ‘our 
grip on [these] traditional points of reference in deference to the singularity of the 
here-right-now’.139 These elements of judicial review thus need to constantly remain 
open to transformation, re-evaluation and reinterpretation.140 Coke ends the Epilogue 
to the Fourth part of the Institutes, after he had elaborated on the jurisdiction of the 
courts, by calling upon his heirs to - 
 
amend both the method or uniformity, and the structure it selfe, wherein they 
shall find either want of windowes, or sufficient lights, or other deficiency in 
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the Architecture whatsoever. And we will conclude with the Aphorisme of that 
great Lawyer and Sage of the Law (which we heard him often say) Blessed be 
the amending hand.141 
 
One of Coke’s spirits continues to call upon us, seeks to persuade us, orders us 
(perhaps, if we could see it, through a writ of mandamus) to question the limits in 
every new context, ‘on account of the necessity of doing justice’.142 In every new 
context where it becomes an issue, the institution of judicial supervision, of 
administrative justice, must be both asserted and undermined. Coke’s mandamus - a 
remedy which speaks of command, obligation and force, but which also invokes the 
spirit of the pure gift and of absolute hospitality and which may possibly be the 
ultimate giving remedy to come - could play an important role in this regard.  
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